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  1 Abstract 
In this paper, statistical and economic analyses are used in identifying, analyzing, 
and modeling the relationships among citizen complaints, swine production and 
community characteristics, EPA inspections, and regulatory violations. The primary 
results of this research include assessments of factors that affect citizen complaints and 
factors that affect the probability of regulatory violations. In addition, the analyses also 
provide statistical results of a comparison of the efficiencies of different types of site 
inspections in regulatory violation detection. Our results provide information valuable for 
understanding issues surrounding the development of the swine production industry and 
local communities.  
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  2 CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, REGULATORY VIOLATIONS, AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SWINE OPERATIONS IN ILLINOIS 
 
Since 1979 the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has operated a livestock 
waste management program that provides for inspection of livestock production facilities 
throughout the state. Generally, Illinois EPA inspections are initiated either by citizen 
complaints or by random selection of facilities based on a regular schedule. Illinois EPA 
takes citizen complaints seriously and responds to each complaint by sending its 
agricultural engineer for site inspection promptly. Citizen complaints can be filed in 
written forms, by phone, or on the Agency’s website. Concurrently, Illinois EPA data 
document that facility inspections are primarily prompted by citizen complaints.   
Hogs are the third largest agricultural commodity in Illinois after corn and 
soybeans. Among all the livestock operations inspected during 1997-2001, swine 
facilities accounted for 62% of the total facilities inspected. Of inspected swine facilities, 
59% were inspected as a response to citizen complaints. From 1997 through 2001, 157 
Illinois swine facilities received odor complaints, 180 received water pollution 
complaints, and 81 received both odor and water pollution complaints (figure 1). Citizen 
complaints may indicate possible noncompliance with the environmental and livestock 
waste regulations, or indicate complainers' concerns over the potential impact of the 
facilities on their health and/or property values. Avoiding citizen complaints is vital to the 
sustainable development of swine production. This has become particularly important 
because of the rapid increase in size of swine operations and the geographic 
concentration of production over the past two decades. To date, a substantial amount of 
data have been accumulated from Illinois EPA site inspections regarding the 
  3 characteristics and regulatory compliance status of operations along with other details. 
These data, obtained from all inspections (those as a result of complaints and those 
conducted on a regular schedule), represent a valuable source of information about 
factors that may cause citizen complaints and facility regulatory violations. The purpose 
of this paper is to explore relationships between facility characteristics, citizen 
complaints, and regulatory violations and suggest implications for the swine industry 
using the citizen complaint and Illinois EPA inspection data.  
Background 
There is a general dearth of formal research on the causes and implications of citizen 
complaints against swine as well as other livestock operations. In an earlier study 
Hardwick counted the number of livestock facilities in the United Kingdom that were 
causing justifiable odor complaints and found that among 1,820 pig, cattle, and poultry 
farms, 46% of the complaints were associated with manure land applications, 25% with 
building odors, and 19% with manure storage. Recently, Kliebenstein and Lorimor 
conducted a survey of Iowa pork producers and found that 21.7% of the 354 producers 
responding had received a complaint in the last five years (Messenger). Their preliminary 
results show that complaints were not necessarily related to farm size and that neighbors 
within 1/8 to 1/2 miles filed more complaints than those living further away. However, 
these findings were limited because they might be subject to potential response bias (e.g., 
producers who had received complaints might be more or less likely to respond to the 
survey than those with no complaints) and lacked adequate statistical evaluation.  
Some economic studies of inspections and regulatory violations in other industries 
have been conducted (Feinstein, 1989; Helland; Smith). Feinstein (1989) constructed 
  4 models to study the factors associated with regulatory noncompliance of U.S. nuclear 
power plants, the variation in detection rates among the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
inspectors, and the relationship between undetected violations and abnormal occurrences. 
Helland used models similar to those proposed by Feinstein (1989) to examine the role of 
inspections in producing regulatory compliance and self-reporting under the Clean Water 
Act in the pulp and paper industry. Smith compared the productivities of two types of 
inspections (i.e., worker complaint initiated vs. generally scheduled inspections) 
conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and found that 
these two types of OSHA inspections were similarly productive in detecting safety 
violations in 1977-79. More recently, Eckert examined the effect of inspections and 
warnings to enforce environmental regulations at the petroleum storage sites in Manitoba, 
Canada using a two-stage-probit model. The author showed that though inspections 
deterred future violations, this effect is small. 
The following sections are designed to answer the following questions: Are 
citizen complaints and regulatory violations related to production characteristics of swine 
facilities such as operating capacity and the type of manure storage? Are citizen 
complaints related to characteristics of the surrounding communities and its citizens such 
as education attainment, income level, and property values? Are complaint-initiated 
inspections as effective as regularly scheduled inspections in detecting air and water 
regulatory violations of the facilities and what are the implications of this analysis on the 
EPA's inspection resource allocation? What are some of the factors that may influence a 
producer's likelihood of having a regulatory violation?  
  5 Association between facility characteristics and citizen complaints and regulatory 
violations 
The characteristics of a livestock facility that are recorded in an Illinois EPA inspection 
include types of livestock raised or boarded, operating capacity in terms of the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) defined animal units (AU)
1, types of 
livestock waste storage structures, number of lagoons or outside holding ponds, types of 
building structures (total confinement or others), and existence of a concrete settling 
basin. Specifically, Illinois EPA categorizes the operating capacities of livestock facilities 
into six groups, ranging from less than 50 to more than 7,000 AU. Since operations with 
a capacity of 1,000 or more AU are subject to more restrictive environmental and 
livestock waste management regulations, we regroup inspected swine facilities into two 
capacity categories: less than 1,000 AU or more than 1,000 AU. Similarly, based on the 
available inspection data, facilities are also divided into two categories using the 
following pairs of nominal variables: with at least one or with no lagoon/holding pond; 
consisting of total confinement buildings only or otherwise; with or without an open 
feedlot; and with or without a concrete settling basin. In addition to categorization based 
on these characteristics, facilities are also categorized by whether or not they are 
complained against and/or are in regulatory violation. Specifically, facilities are 
categorized according to whether they receive an odor complaint, a water pollution 
complaint, or either of these two complaints. Regulatory violations are distinguished by 
air emission violations, water pollution violations, and any regulatory violations.
2 The 
number of inspected swine facilities in terms of the above categorizations is shown in 
table 1. 
  6 We assume that facilities that are not complained against but inspected are chosen 
without regard to specific facility characteristics. This assumption is reasonable since in 
most cases the Illinois EPA inspectors do not have information about a facility's 
production characteristics prior to their visit to the facility regardless of whether the 
inspection is complaint-prompted or not. Statistical analysis of categorical data is used to 
assess the relationship between pairs of categorical variables, i.e., the relationship 
between the column variables such as facilities receiving an odor complaint or receiving 
no odor complaint and row variables such as operating capacity less than 1000 AU or 
greater than 1000 AU.  The null hypothesis of no association between the row variable 
and the column variable is tested using various chi-square tests (Everitt; SAS Institute 
Inc.).
3  The hypotheses and their statistical test results are summarized in table 2, in 
which the lowest chi-square statistic and highest P value for each null hypothesis are 
reported. The statistical tests as well as other statistical analyses in this paper are all 
conducted using the SAS program Version 8.2. 
Our results (table 2) show that operating capacity greater than 1,000 AU is 
statistically associated with more odor complaints (χ
2=21, P<0.001) and more air 
emission violations (χ
2=10.74, P=0.001). However, capacity less than 1,000 AU is 
associated with more water pollution complaints (χ
2=6.06, P=0.014), more water 
regulatory violations (χ
2=19.89, P<0.001), and more overall regulatory violations 
(χ
2=4.7, P<0.03). Contrary to our intuition, outside lagoons/holding ponds are associated 
with fewer odor complaints (χ
2=4.83, P<0.028), i.e., facilities with no outside 
lagoons/holding ponds are more likely to receive odor complaints. But we found no 
association (P>0.05) between waste storage type and other complaints/regulatory 
  7 violations. Facilities with only total confinement buildings are associated with more odor 
complaints (χ
2=25.15, P<0.001) and more air emission violations (χ
2=3.94, P=0.047) but 
with fewer water complaints (χ
2=9.38, P=0.002) and fewer water regulatory violations 
(χ
2=64.93, P<0.001). When both odor and water pollution complaints and both air and 
water violations are considered, our results suggest that total confinement facilities lead 
to more citizen complaints (χ
2=3.85, P=0.05) while facilities other than total confinement 
result in more regulatory violations (χ
2=38.36, P<0.001). Facilities with open feedlots are 
associated with fewer odor complaints (χ
2=24.91, P<0.001) but more water pollution 
complaints (χ
2=11.13, P<0.001), more water pollution violations (χ
2=70.47, P<0.001), 
and more overall regulatory violations (χ
2=44.17, P<0.001). However, total confinement 
facilities are not significantly associated with more air emission violations or more 
overall citizen complaints. Finally, facilities with a concrete settling basin are associated 
with fewer odor complaints (χ
2=6.79, P=0.009) but more water and overall regulatory 
violations (χ
2=15.03, P<0.001; and χ
2=7.49, P=0.006, respectively). 
Association between citizen complaints and community characteristics 
  Economic theory suggests that citizens are more likely to complain to the 
authorities about pollution when the expected benefits from agency action are likely to 
exceed the expected costs for their own investment of time and effort. According to 
Dasgupta and Wheeler, factors affecting citizen complaints in a region include pollution 
damage suffered by the individual, the individual's understanding of the problem (which 
is assumed to be a function of education), and the cost of a complaint (which is assumed 
to be a function of income). The relationship between citizen complaints and community 
characteristics is assessed using the county level data and an econometric model with the 
  8 proportion of swine production facilities receiving complaints as the dependent variable. 
Among the independent variables, we include average swine operation scale, swine 
inventory intensity, and soil productivity rating to capture the pollution damage potential 
caused by swine production; proportion of residents with a high school diploma or higher 
to proxy education attainment of the residents in a county; and median household income 
in 2000. Other county characteristic variables such as distance to nearest city of a 
population over 50,000, rural-urban continuum code (Beale code), average farmland 
price, average home price, population density, and proportion of residents aged over 65 
were also tried but eliminated in our analysis because of collinearity problems or showing 
little statistical significance. Table 3 describes the variables used in this study (for further 
description of these variables, see Huang et al.). 
  Table 4 shows that the three models of citizen complaints produce similar 
estimation results and all are statistically significant. In addition, the signs of the 
coefficients are, in general, as expected. Higher swine inventory intensity leads to higher 
percentage of swine facilities being complained against. This finding is consistent with 
our intuition that higher swine production intensity in terms of number of hogs per square 
mile may generate greater environmental pollution and hence a higher proportion of 
facilities being complained against. However, the estimated coefficient of the average 
swine operation scale bears a negative sign, suggesting that given the number of hogs in a 
county, more concentrated production may be associated with less overall environmental 
pollution at the county level and therefore lead to a lower proportion of facilities 
receiving citizen complaints. A plausible explanation for this finding is that most of the 
large operations are relatively new and rely on more advanced production technologies 
  9 that are less offensive to citizens in the local communities.
4 Our results also show that 
higher soil productivity ratings are related to a higher proportion of facilities being 
complained against. Since soil productivity ratings are used to capture pollution damage 
potential arising from swine production, the higher the soil productivity, the higher the 
marginal pollution damage becomes. On the other hand, owners of land with higher soil 
productivity ratings have more incentive to protect their land that has higher values.  
Moreover, consistent with economic theory, a higher household income tends to cause a 
lower proportion of facilities being complained against because the opportunity cost of 
complaints is higher in high income counties. Finally, it is worth noting that the adjusted 
R
2s are low (less than 0.2) in all three estimated equations, suggesting that factors 
affecting citizen complaints are far more complicated than what we have modeled.  
Efficiencies of complaint-initiated and regularly scheduled inspections in detecting 
regulatory violations 
The usefulness of citizen complaints for regulatory enforcement agencies to 
allocate inspection resources is controversial (Smith; Dasgupta and Wheeler). One view 
is that complaints are undoubtedly a source of low-cost information, since pollution and 
regulatory violations of a facility are often apparent to their neighbors even if they are 
invisible to governmental agencies. The other is that complainers may lack sufficient 
information to distinguish between a nuisance and a true regulatory violation. In addition, 
some individuals or communities may have a higher propensity to complain than others, 
regardless of the objective situation. Therefore, if agencies respond to complaints, 
aggressive complainers may capture most of the available resources.  
  10As noted earlier, the Illinois EPA is responsive to each complaint with a site 
inspection and complaint-initiated inspections compose a majority (59%) of the agency's 
swine facility inspections. In order to assess the relative efficiency of complaint-initiated 
and regularly scheduled inspections in violation detection, swine facility inspections are 
divided into odor complaint initiated, water pollution complaint initiated, both odor and 
water pollution initiated inspections, and regularly scheduled inspections. The 
efficiencies of these four types of inspections in detecting different regulatory violations 
are compared using the statistical analysis of categorical variables as described earlier. 
The specific regulatory violations that are examined and the related inspection data 
summary on which the analysis is based are shown in table 5. The related hypotheses and 
statistical test results are presented in table 6.  
Our results show that compared with regularly scheduled inspections, odor 
complaint initiated inspections are more efficient in detecting air emissions violations but 
less efficient in detecting various water pollution related violations. On the other hand, 
water pollution initiated inspections are more efficient than regularly scheduled ones in 
detecting water quality standard violations, runoff control requirement violations, manure 
handling/storage requirement violations, and field application criteria violations. 
However, there is no statistical difference between a water complaint and a regular 
inspection in detecting an effluent standard violation and an air emission violation. 
Between regularly scheduled and those prompted by both odor and water pollution 
complaints, the latter show a higher efficiency in detecting air emission and field 
application criteria violations while there is no statistical difference between the two in 
detecting water quality standard, effluent standard, runoff control requirement, and 
  11manure handling/storage requirement violations. It appears that our results tend to 
support the view that inspections prompted by citizen complaints are more likely to 
identify facilities with violations than regularly scheduled visits, suggesting that the 
Illinois EPA has responded properly if the goal is to detect violations.  
Factors affecting regulatory violations 
According to the theory of rational crime (Becker), a profit-maximizing facility 
will violate an environmental regulation as long as the compliance cost exceeds the 
expected penalty of noncompliance. The basic premises of this theory help us to 
formulate appropriate variables to include in the analysis and interpret the results, even 
though one might argue that most swine producers, just like most citizens, generally 
abide by the existing laws and regulations. Following this theory, three factors influence 
a facility's regulatory violation: the cost of compliance, the cost of the penalty, and the 
likelihood of the penalty. However, such data are usually unavailable. In this analysis, a 
facility's production characteristics such as operating capacity and type of waste storage 
are used as a proxy for compliance cost because they are important determinants of this 
cost. The expected economic penalty of noncompliance for swine facilities in Illinois can 
be a fine and the cost of compliance.
5 Again, due to the lack of such data, we use 
community characteristics to proxy the expected economic penalty of a violation. This 
treatment is reasonable as inspections and the stringency of environmental enforcement 
are usually determined by the economic situation of the surrounding communities 
(Helland). Other factors that may contribute to noncompliance include the history of past 
violations and the difference in inspectors' ability to detect violations. Noncompliance 
history is important because often violations can only be corrected with a capital 
  12investment such as the installation of a new abatement technology (Helland). In our 
analysis, we use the number of on-site visits by EPA staff as a proxy for the violation 
history of a facility and we expect that past violations are positively related to current 
violations (Magat and Viscusi). It has been documented that inspectors may differ 
substantially in their detection of violations for various reasons (Feinstein, 1989). 
Inspectors not only determine whether or not a violation exists but also influence a 
facility's compliance behavior.
6 Hence, the probability of a violation can be modeled as a 
latent variable that is a function with the following form as suggested in the regulatory 
violation literature (Helland; Feintein, 1989): 
Yj
* = Xβ+ uj    (1) 






0 ) ( 0





Y if violation no
Y if violation in
where Yj is the observed binary variable as defined above; X denotes an array of 
variables likely to affect the probability of a facility's regulatory compliance as discussed 
above; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated; uj is a disturbance term representing 
unobservable facility and community characteristics and factors that affect the costs and 
benefits of compliance; and j is a subscript index for facility. Assuming that uj is 
normally distributed, model (1) therefore becomes a probit model that can be estimated 
using conventional maximum likelihood techniques.
7  
  In specification, facility characteristic variables include current operating capacity 
in terms of the NPDES defined animal units, number of outside lagoons/holding ponds, 
building type (total confinement or otherwise), and type of settling basin (concrete or 
otherwise). Feedlot type (open feedlot or otherwise) is omitted due to its high correlation 
  13coefficient (0.96) with building type. Community characteristic variables include distance 
to the nearest city over 50,000, rural-urban continuum code (Beale code), population 
density, annual household income, education attainment of the residents, swine inventory 
intensity, and average scale of swine operation.
8 Other variables include number of on-
site visits by EPA staff, investigator, and year when violations occurred, hoping to 
capture the trend over time in facilities' compliance behavior. More detailed description 
of these variables is presented in table 7. 
  To alleviate concerns about statistical sampling issues that may arise from the 
inspection data, we divide the data into two categories: one consisting of all the facilities 
that have been complained against while the other consisting of all the facilities that have 
been inspected based on a regular schedule. The former represents a complete population 
of facilities being complained against while the latter is assumed to be a random sampling 
from a large population consisting of facilities that have not been complained against. 
The model is separately estimated for each of these two data sets. The estimation of the 
model is carried out using the SAS probit procedure and the results are presented in table 
8. 
  Our results show that the probability of regulatory violations of a facility 
significantly depends on whom the EPA inspector is, consistent with the existing 
literature that an inspector's ability to detect a violation or her strictness in regulatory 
enforcement can substantially influence a facility's compliance behavior. The probability 
of violation might decrease over time but this decreasing trend is not statistically 
significant. As expected, the coefficient for number of visits by EPA staff is positive and 
significant, indicating that violations take time to correct.  
  14  Similar to our finding regarding the association between citizen complaints and 
operating capacities (see table 2), our results show that the probability of violations is 
independent of a facility's operating capacity. One may expect that larger operating 
capacity means higher compliance cost and hence higher violation probability. However, 
the literature on regulatory compliance also suggests that larger facilities may be more 
likely to be in compliance because of the lower cost per unit of emission removal when 
economies of scale in compliance exist (Gray and Deily). Therefore, the influence of 
operating capacity on compliance behavior is an empirical issue and we did not find 
evidence that the capacity of a facility would have an impact on the facility's probability 
of violation. Similarly, we did not find evidence that the number of lagoons/holding 
ponds would influence the probability of violation. However, we did find strong evidence 
that total confinement facilities tended to have a lower probability of violation in both 
study populations. This finding is not surprising since total confinement facilities are 
usually new and better equipped, suggesting that total confinement facilities may have a 
lower compliance cost. Also, this finding is in accordance with an earlier result that non 
total confinement facilities are associated with more regulatory violations (see table 2). 
Our results regarding the impact of concrete settling basin on the probability of violation 
are mixed: among the EPA selected facilities, a concrete settling basin tends to make 
violations less likely; while among the citizen complained facilities, a concrete settling 
basin may tend to make violations more likely (although this association is not 
statistically significant). 
  The community characteristics included in our analysis exhibit no statistically 
significant influence on the violation probability of the facilities inspected on a regular 
  15schedule. Among the facilities with citizen complaints, our results show that facilities 
located in counties with a higher swine inventory intensity also have a higher probability 
of violation. If we assume that community characteristics partially capture the expected 
penalty of violation, it is reasonable to argue that the expected violation penalty could be 
less severe in major hog producing counties than elsewhere. Another interesting finding 
among this category is that there is significant evidence that the income level of the 
communities does not affect the probability of violation. In general, our results show that 
a facility's compliance behavior is not obviously affected by community characteristics. 
Conclusions 
  In this paper, statistical and economic analyses are used in identifying, analyzing, 
and modeling the relationships among citizen complaints, swine production and 
community characteristics, EPA inspections, and regulatory violations. The primary 
results of this research include assessments of factors that affect citizen complaints and 
factors that affect the probability of regulatory violations. In addition, the analyses also 
provide statistical results of a comparison of the efficiencies of different types of site 
inspections in regulatory violation detection. Our results provide information that helps 
better our understanding of the complicated issues concerning the development of the 
swine production industry and local communities. Our results are useful for swine 
producers and consultants to develop best management strategies that minimize citizen 
complaints and regulatory violations leading to improved sustainability and vitality of the 
swine industry. Our results can also be valuable in helping livestock production and 
environmental regulatory administrations to better use their management or enforcement 
resources. 
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Figure 1 Number of swine facilities receiving citizen complaints 



















  19Table 1. Categorization of inspected swine facilities in Illinois, 1997-2001 
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type  Total  238  473 711  116  595 711 
Total confinement 















Total  238  472 710  115  594 709 
Open feedlot 
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  20Table 2. Hypotheses and statistical test results regarding the association between 
facility characteristics and citizen complaints and regulatory violations 
Odor complaints  Air emission violations  Facility 
characteristics  Hypothesis  χ
2 and P value  Hypothesis  χ
2 and P value 
Operating capacity  H0: no association 
H1: larger capacity, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 21.00 
P < 0.001 
H0: No association 
H1: larger capacity, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 10.74 
P = 0.001 
Waste storage type  H0: no association 
H1: no lagoons/ponds, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 4.83 
P = 0.028 




2 = 0.10 
P = 0.749 
Building type  H0: no association 
H1: total confinement, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 25.15 
P < 0.001 
H0: no association 
H1: total confinement, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 3.93 
P = 0.047 
Feedlot type  H0: no association 
H1: no open feedlot, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 24.91 
P < 0.001 
H0: no association 
H1: no open feedlot, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 3.62 
P = 0.057 
Settling basin type  H0: no association 
H1: non concrete, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 6.79 
P = 0.009 
H0: no association 
H1: non concrete, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 0.05 
P = 0.825 
Water pollution complaints  Water regulatory violations  Facility 
characteristics  Hypothesis  χ
2 and P value  Hypothesis  χ
2 and P value 
Operating capacity  H0: no association 
H1: smaller capacity, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 6.06 
P = 0.014 
H0: No association 
H1: smaller capacity, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 19.89 
P < 0.001 
Waste storage type  H0: no association 
H1: no lagoons/ponds, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 0.32 
P = 0.573 




2 = 0.73 
P = 0.392 
Building type  H0: no association 
H1: non confinement, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 9.38 
P = 0.002 
H0: no association 
H1: non confinement, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 64.93 
P < 0.001 
Feedlot type  H0: no association 
H1: open feedlot, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 11.13 
P < 0.001 
H0: no association 
H1: open feedlot, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 70.47 
P < 0.001 
Settling basin type  H0: no association 
H1: non concrete, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 1.71 
P = 0.191 
H0: no association 
H1: concrete, more 
violations 
χ
2 = 15.03 
P < 0.001 
Odor and/or water complaints  Any regulatory violations  Facility 
characteristics  Hypothesis  χ
2 and P value  Hypothesis  χ
2 and P value 
Operating capacity  H0: no association 
H1: larger capacity, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 2.16 
P = 0.142 
H0: No association 
H1: smaller capacity, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 4.70 
P = 0.030 
Waste storage type  H0: no association 
H1: no lagoons/ponds, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 3.11 
P = 0.078 




2 = 0.61 
P = 0.436 
Building type  H0: no association 
H1: total confinement, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 3.85 
P = 0.050 
H0: no association 
H1: non confinement, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 38.36 
P < 0.001 
Feedlot type  H0: no association 
H1: no open feedlot, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 2.65 
P =0.104 
H0: no association 
H1: open feedlot, 
more violations 
χ
2 = 44.17 
P < 0.001 
Settling basin type  H0: no association 
H1: non concrete, 
more complaints 
χ
2 = 0.63 
P = 0.427 
H0: no association 
H1: concrete, more 
violations 
χ
2 = 7.49 
P = 0.006 






Comrate  5.64  5.16  Percentage of swine facilities 
receiving either a water 
pollution or/and an odor 
complaint, %.   
Illinois EPA and 
1997 Census of 
Agricultural. 
Wcomrate 3.63  3.43  Percentage of swine facilities 
receiving a water pollution 
complaint, %.   
Illinois EPA and 
1997 Census of 
Agricultural. 
Ocomrate 3.14  3.87  Percentage of swine facilities 
receiving an odor complaint, 
%.   
Illinois EPA and 
1997 Census of 
Agricultural. 





ASOS  599.44  380.83  Average swine operation scale, 
hogs/operation. 
1997 Census of 
Agricultural. 
SPR 72.39  14.21  Soil  productivity  ratings, 
ranging from 5 to 100 based on 






Income  38775  8736  Median household income, $.  2000 Census of 
Population. 
 
Table 4. Complaints and county characteristics model estimation results 
Dependent variable  Independent 











































# of observations  95  95  95 





2 0.19 0.17 0.06 
t statistics are shown in parentheses below estimated coefficients. 
*Significant at the 0.1 level. 
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
  22Table 5. Efficiency in identifying violations by inspection type in Illinois, 1997-2001
a 


















Water quality standards 
(subtitle C) 
7 (4.5%)  60 (33.3%)  19 (23.5%)  47 (16.0%) 
Effluent standards 
(subtitle C) 
5 (3.2%)  34 (18.9%)  14 (17.3%)  47 (16.0%) 
Air emissions (9a)  77 (49.0%)  3 (0.6%)  36 (44.4%)  3 (1.0%) 
Runoff control 
requirements (501.403) 
11 (7.0%)  66 (36.7%)  18 (22.2%)  61 (20.8%) 
Handling/storage 
requirements (501.404) 
20 (12.7%)  96 (53.3%)  23 (28.4%)  79 (27.0%) 
Field application 
criteria 
25 (15.9%)  24 (13.3%)  22 (27.2)  4 (1.4%) 
No violations  61(38.9%)  42(23.3%)  22(27.2%)  168(57.3%) 
Number of facilities 
inspected 
157 180  81  293 
a Figures in the table are numbers of violations and their percentage in parentheses. 
Table 6. Hypotheses and statistical test results of the efficiency of inspections in 
violation detection 
Odor complaint vs. regular 
inspections 
Water complaint vs. 
regular inspections 
Odor & waster complaint 
vs. regular inspections 
Type of 
regulatory 
violation  Hypothesis  χ
2 & P 
value 
Hypothesis  χ
2 & P 
value 
Hypothesis  χ





H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 








H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 







H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 








H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 








H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 







H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 





H0: no difference 












Violation  0.59  0.49  Dummy variable, 1 for detecting 
at least a violation and 0 for none.   
Illinois EPA. 
Invest1  0.21  0.41  Dummy variable, 1 for inspection 
by investigator 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
Invest2  0.16  0.36  Dummy variable, 1 for inspection 
by investigator 2 and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
Invest3  0.19  0.40  Dummy variable, 1 for inspection 
by investigator 3 and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
Invest4  0.12  0.33  Dummy variable, 1 for inspection 
by investigator 4 and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
Invest5  0.12  0.33  Dummy variable, 1 for inspection 
by investigator 5 and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
Invest5  0.19  0.40  Dummy variable, 1 for inspection 
by investigator 6 and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
visit  1.67  1.57  Number of on-site visits by EPA 
staff during the current calendar 
year. 
Illinois EPA. 
Capacity   1227  1430  Current operating capacity, AU.  Illinois EPA. 
Lagoon  1.03  1.41  Number of outside 
lagoons/holding ponds. 
Illinois EPA. 
Building   0.54  0.50  Dummy variable, 1 for total 
confinement and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
Basin  0.09  0.28  Dummy variable, 1 for concrete 
settling basin and 0 otherwise. 
Illinois EPA. 
SII  68.74  63.79  Swine inventory intensity at the 
county level, hogs/mile
2. 
Illinois Department of 
Agriculture. 
ASOS  599.44  380.83  Average swine operation scale at 
the county level, hogs/operation. 
1997 Census of 
Agricultural. 
Popdens  68.50  76.98  Population density at the county 
level, residents/mile
2. 
2000 Census of 
Population. 
Income  38775  8736  Median household income of the 
county, $. 
2000 Census of 
Population. 
Highsch  81.52  4.26  Proxy for education attainment, 
percentage of residents with a 
high school education or above, 
%. 
2000 Census of 
Population. 
SPR  72.39  14.21  Soil productivity ratings, ranging 
from 5 to 100 based on the 
relative ability of soils to grow 
crops. 
Illinois Farm Business 
Farm Management 
Association. 
Distance  52.20  28.30  Distance from a county's centroid 
to city over 50,000, mile. 
Authors' computation 
using ArcView GIS. 
Beale  5.45  2.04  Rural-urban continuum code 
(Beale code), value between 0 and 
9. 
Economic Research 
Service (ERS), USDA. 
 
  24Table 8. Facility regulatory violation model estimation results 
Dependent variable: probability of violation  Independent variable 











































































Highsch (percentage of residents 





















Log Likelihood   -205.63  -110.17 
Number of observations  417  290 
Chi-square statistics are shown in parentheses below estimated coefficients. 
*Significant at the 0.1 level. 
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Endnote 
 
1 "Animal unit" is a term defined by the regulations to reflect pollution equivalents among 
the different animal types. Animal unit varies according to animal type and one animal is 
usually not equal to one animal unit. For instance, one slaughter/feeder steer is equal to 
1.0 AU while a market hog weighing over 55 pounds is equal to only 0.4 AU, suggesting 
that one steer and 2.5 market hogs generate about the same amount of pollution.  
2 A facility is cited for an air emission violation if one or more atmospheric contaminants 
exceed the standards (quantity) adopted by Illinois EPA under the Environmental 
Protection Act during inspection. When a facility is cited for a water pollution violation, 
one or more of the following violations occur: water quality standards, effluent standards, 
runoff control requirements, waste handling/ storage requirements, manure field 
application criteria, NPDES permit provisions, and no NPDES permit. In addition to air 
and water pollution violations, any violations also include other regulatory violations 
such as new facility location. 
3 The chi-square test statistics used in this analysis include the Pearson chi-square, the 
likelihood chi-square, the continuity-adjusted chi-square, and Mantel-Haenszel chi-
square. All these test statistics were computed using the SAS FREQ procedure and 
produced qualitatively identical results in our analysis.    
4 Coincidently, in a separate study of Illinois farmland values, Huang et al. find that 
Illinois farmland prices are negatively associated with swine inventory intensity but 
positively related to the average swine operation scale using aggregate county level data. 
Both results indicate that more concentrated swine production might be more 
environmentally friendly from a macro perspective.   27
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 If it is a first time violation and not of a serious nature, the facility will be asked to take 
measures to stop the violation and prevent future violations. This may require a capital 
investment by the facility. Yet many times the situation can be corrected with managerial 
changes only. If it is a continuing violation problem or a violation of a serious nature 
(e.g., fish kill), the matter will be referred to the Illinois Attorney General's Office for an 
enforcement action. In this case, the Illinois EPA can suggest a civil fine in addition to 
any damage assessment due to the destruction of aquatic species. The Attorney General's 
Office can use the suggestion or change it. 
6 Another reason for including the investigator variable is that violation detection data are 
censored since no data on undetected violations exist (Feinstein, 1990). Empirical studies 
using such censored data without appropriate corrections may produce biased results. The 
inclusion of the inspector variable can partially correct for this potential bias.  
7 The disturbance term uj was also assumed to be logistically distributed and model (1) 
hence became a logit model and was estimated using the SAS logistic procedure. Our 
results show that both models produce qualitatively identical estimates.   
8 Land price and house price are excluded because of their high correlation coefficients 
with household income (0.73 and 0.90, respectively). 